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Of course, the term "policy analysis" does not identify a single research orientation. Some scholars focus on specific kinds of public policies as a way of sharpening our observations and explanations of political phenomena. They seek to show how the policy-making process varies, depending on the particular issue under consideration.6 Others are specifically concerned with the evaluation of policy outcomes and their impact on the political system.7 Still others are interested in the general, abstract delineation of policy-making processes.8
In the present article we shall be concerned primarily with the aspects of policy analysis related to the problem of public choice and with the role of comparative politics in that endeavor. The intellectual task becomes that of the definition and clarification of public problems, the search for alternative public means for coping with these problems, and the analysis of probable consequences that would follow from the adoption of particular courses of public action.9 In a sense, the vantage point of the political scientist shifts from that of detached observer to that of surrogate policy maker. An appropriate analogy is to the orientation of the economist who postulates a certain set of public objectives and seeks to determine the course of action most appropriate to their realization. Giovanni Sartori states well the distinction as it applies to the problem of development: "With reference to economic development the economist is a planner, with reference to political development the political scientist is a spectator. The economist intervenes: His knowledge is applied knowledge. The political scientist awaits: He explains what happens, but does not make it happen." 10 Of course, the term "policy analysis" does not identify a single research orientation. Some scholars focus on specific kinds of public policies as a way of sharpening our observations and explanations of political phenomena. They seek to show how the policy-making process varies, depending on the particular issue under consideration.6 Others are specifically concerned with the evaluation of policy outcomes and their impact on the political system.7 Still others are interested in the general, abstract delineation of policy-making processes.8
In the present article we shall be concerned primarily with the aspects of policy analysis related to the problem of public choice and with the role of comparative politics in that endeavor. The intellectual task becomes that of the definition and clarification of public problems, the search for alternative public means for coping with these problems, and the analysis of probable consequences that would follow from the adoption of particular courses of public action.9 In a sense, the vantage point of the political scientist shifts from that of detached observer to that of surrogate policy maker. An appropriate analogy is to the orientation of the economist who postulates a certain set of public objectives and seeks to determine the course of action most appropriate to their realization. Giovanni Sartori states well the distinction as it applies to the problem of development: "With reference to economic development the economist is a planner, with reference to political development the political scientist is a spectator. The economist intervenes: His knowledge is applied knowledge. The political scientist awaits: He explains what happens, but does not make it happen." 10
In recent years the training of political scientists has focused on defining situations, while economics has developed habits of thinking toward strategies of action. One powerful statement of the economist's style which has special applicability to comparative analysis is found in the work of the Dutch economist and Nobel laureate, Jan Tinbergen."l The project I shall describe for comparative politics is basically an extension of Tinbergen's way of thinking to the conventional concerns of political science. I have also been interested in defining approaches to policy analysis that were jointly political and economic, for these aspects of policymaking are never separate in practice.12
Comparative Politics and Policy Analysis
In the present effort to build an applied political science, the focus is inward, on the problems of our own society. It is the product of a generation that sees Western society passing through a most urgent and critical period. That generation wishes to develop professional skills that are useful in the diagnosis and resolution of these problems. The potential contribution of comparative politics to this endeavor is not immediately apparent. The postwar renaissance of comparative politics came at a time when the problems of other peoples, particularly in the developing areas, seemed far more urgent than those of the West. Certainly, we would not want to argue that the new internationalism of American political science should be abandoned and that we turn inward, in response to the mood of the times. The more tantalizing problem is to specify how the skills of systematic comparative analysis can contribute to the problem-solving resources of any given society.
Of course the cosmopolitan intellectual, aware of developments and possibilities in other cultures, has always been a critical agent of change. He has served as something of a broker of good ideas between nations, and, more often than not, he has seen foreign experience from the perspective of the problems of his own nation. As Alexis de Toqueville points out in respect to his inquiries into the status and prospects of the American democracy, "It is not, then, merely to satisfy a legitimate 
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Of course the cosmopolitan intellectual, aware of developments and possibilities in other cultures, has always been a critical agent of change. He has served as something of a broker of good ideas between nations, and, more often than not, he has seen foreign experience from the perspective of the problems of his own nation. As Alexis de Toqueville points out in respect to his inquiries into the status and prospects of the American democracy, "It is not, then, merely to satisfy a legitimate curiosity that I have examined America; my wish has been to find there instruction by which we may ourselves profit." 13 In recent years, the emphasis in comparative politics has been on cultural detachment. The stance of a de Toqueville has been exchanged for that of a Herskovitz or a Malinowski. Nonetheless, the longer tradition of comparative analysis has aspired to policy relevance. The classical tradition of comparison involved the inductive examination of diverse cases in an attempt to establish, in Aristotle and Montesquieu, principles of constitutional form, in Machiavelli, explicit maxims of statecraft. The currently maligned late nineteenth-century emphasis on constitutional engineering did, as Harry Eckstein points out, accompany the great period of constitution writing in the West. The role of the political scientist in the diffusion of liberal democratic institutions in that period perhaps parallels the present-day work of economists in spreading the paraphernalia of post-Keynesian economic institutions and practice.l4 In the postwar emphasis on the politics of the developing nations there was also some consciousness of the implications of analysis for policy recommendation.
A preoccupation with macropolitics no doubt limits the practical utility of comparative analysis. Since Aristotle, the emphasis has been on the normative evaluation of total political systems. Taxonomies of political forms have been constructed, and the advantages and disadvantages of different types of government weighed. This tradition has been carried into even the most contemporary research. Political development is usually discussed in terms of the relative merits of mass mobilization, military, tutelary, and democratic systems. This focus on the largest question of politics, the structure of the regime itself, probably has something to do with the limited policy relevance of the field. After all, the architectonic act of government is rare. Moreover, when it happens, the expert analyst plays little role in the outcome. By and large, comparative politics has not adopted styles of analysis pertinent to "normal" politics, to that "piecemeal social engineering" that Karl Popper commends as the appropriate approach of the policy analyst in a democratic society.'5 Total political institutions and processes emerge out of a specific cul- In recent years, the emphasis in comparative politics has been on cultural detachment. The stance of a de Toqueville has been exchanged for that of a Herskovitz or a Malinowski. Nonetheless, the longer tradition of comparative analysis has aspired to policy relevance. The classical tradition of comparison involved the inductive examination of diverse cases in an attempt to establish, in Aristotle and Montesquieu, principles of constitutional form, in Machiavelli, explicit maxims of statecraft. The currently maligned late nineteenth-century emphasis on constitutional engineering did, as Harry Eckstein points out, accompany the great period of constitution writing in the West. The role of the political scientist in the diffusion of liberal democratic institutions in that period perhaps parallels the present-day work of economists in spreading the paraphernalia of post-Keynesian economic institutions and practice.l4 In the postwar emphasis on the politics of the developing nations there was also some consciousness of the implications of analysis for policy recommendation.
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The problem, then, is to find an approach to comparative policy analysis that deals more with the bits and pieces of politics than with overall structures and processes. In fact, politics seems to be more of an adaptive than an innovative art. True political invention is relatively rare. Creative statecraft seems far more like husbandry-a matter of adapting to changing conditions by nurturing selected strains and species-than like technological discovery and invention.'8
The Design of Measures
The role of the policy analyst becomes apparent. He assists in constructing an inventory of potential public capabilities and resources that might be pertinent in any problem-solving situation; he tries to evaluate the applicability of alternative combinations of actions; and he seeks to evaluate the potential and actual consequences of patterns of public action. One function of comparative policy analysis might be to extend the process of policy search, policy formulation, and evaluation across the jurisdictional frontiers of a single policy, and thus to enrich the problem-solving capabilities of any society.
Procedural Instrumentation
The first issue of public problem solving is to decide how to decide. The practical question is how to fashion a decision-making procedure that will result in the most adequate public choice. The problem is one of the choice, orchestration, and sequence of techniques of participation, consultation, research, and deliberation that will insure the effective consideration and resolution of a public issue.
Karl Deutsch sees procedural instrumentation primarily in terms of the information functions of governing, and suggests the role of comparative analysis.
The channels and institutions by means of which a government or a party obtains and uses information concerning its own constituency and personnel and the efficiency with which such information is collected, applied and perhaps stored for future use in records or in the memories of men, are all promising objects of comparative political studies. In democracies, such studies may deal with the comparative effectiveness of hearings, opinion polls, "grass roots" politics, pressuregroup activities and the like. In dictatorships . . . such studies may throw some light on the ability of particular political regimes or organizations to appraise their own internal resources and obstacles, and to steer their own behavior accordingly.'9 Constitutional rules are the most general body of procedures. These must be invoked for all classes of decisions committing the polity. Additional specifications may be made for particular kinds of decisions, such as consultation with economic advisors or central banking authorities for certain types of economic decisions. There may be certain con- The role of the policy analyst becomes apparent. He assists in constructing an inventory of potential public capabilities and resources that might be pertinent in any problem-solving situation; he tries to evaluate the applicability of alternative combinations of actions; and he seeks to evaluate the potential and actual consequences of patterns of public action. One function of comparative policy analysis might be to extend the process of policy search, policy formulation, and evaluation across the jurisdictional frontiers of a single policy, and thus to enrich the problem-solving capabilities of any society.
The channels and institutions by means of which a government or a party obtains and uses information concerning its own constituency and personnel and the efficiency with which such information is collected, applied and perhaps stored for future use in records or in the memories of men, are all promising objects of comparative political studies. In democracies, such studies may deal with the comparative effectiveness of hearings, opinion polls, "grass roots" politics, pressuregroup activities and the like. In dictatorships . . . such studies may throw some light on the ability of particular political regimes or organizations to appraise their own internal resources and obstacles, and to steer their own behavior accordingly.'9 Constitutional rules are the most general body of procedures. These must be invoked for all classes of decisions committing the polity. Additional specifications may be made for particular kinds of decisions, such as consultation with economic advisors or central banking authorities for certain types of economic decisions. There may be certain con- ventions or customs relating to consultation between major groups in the society. All of these are part of the "procedural equipment" of the society. In addition, there is a complex legacy of possible forms of consultation, investigation, study, and deliberation that may or may not be activated, depending on the content of the particular decision at hand and the judgment of those involved as to what is appropriate under the circumstances.
In all procedures, there is a certain discretion left to the policy maker as to how a particular institution or process will be used in the formulation of a specific decision. For example, in his relationship with the legislature, one "policy entrepreneur" may feel that his task is done when he has prepared a technically competent proposal. It is then up to legislative leaders to generate political support for the measure. In other words, in his own vision of the procedural scheme, the policy maker "uses" the legislature to generate consent. Another policy maker may understand his job as that of presenting the legislature wih a politically feasible proposal. For him, it might be appropriate to "equip" his policymaking procedure with an ad hoc committee of the powerful to refine the administration proposal into politically acceptable form. For the point of view of this policy maker, the only planned use for the legislature is that of formal ratification. Albert 0. Hirschman provides an illustration of precisely this point in his study of the formulation of an agrarian reform law in Colombia.20
From this point of view, the institutional heritage of a society, as well as both formal and informal protocols that attach to how decisions will be made, constitutes a stock of equipment available to decision makers for the development of public choices. One function of comparative analysis, then, includes the inventory of the "warehouse full of semifabricated parts" available to policy makers in fashioning decision systems. In the comparative evaluation of political systems, we might want to focus on the richness and flexibility of the procedural equipment provided to decision makers by the political system. It also becomes possible to evaluate the performance of policy makers, i.e., the effectiveness of their use of the institutional resources made available to them by their society.21
The design of procedures for specific problem-solving situations also becomes a choice target for applied political science. Based on his 
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ventions or customs relating to consultation between major groups in the society. All of these are part of the "procedural equipment" of the society. In addition, there is a complex legacy of possible forms of consultation, investigation, study, and deliberation that may or may not be activated, depending on the content of the particular decision at hand and the judgment of those involved as to what is appropriate under the circumstances.
The design of procedures for specific problem-solving situations also becomes a choice target for applied political science. Based on his ventions or customs relating to consultation between major groups in the society. All of these are part of the "procedural equipment" of the society. In addition, there is a complex legacy of possible forms of consultation, investigation, study, and deliberation that may or may not be activated, depending on the content of the particular decision at hand and the judgment of those involved as to what is appropriate under the circumstances.
The design of procedures for specific problem-solving situations also becomes a choice target for applied political science. Based on his knowledge of the procedural repertoire of a particular political system, the analyst may be able to recommend innovative ways of going about the business of formulating policy in particular issue areas.
The possibility of such procedural engineering raises some serious problems about the role of the policy analyst as policy adviser. Economists have faced these, too, and they have not succeeded in resolving them satisfactorily. Normally, the economic adviser's art is that of fashioning measures adequate to the achievement of objectives specified by the political authorities. If extended to the process of procedural instrumentation, such a definition of the role of the policy analyst would result in a crude Machiavellianism, a matter of expediting the policy maker's purposes. After all, what the policy maker seeks in manipulating procedure is the achievement of his goals, the reduction of friction, conflict, skepticism, and "cognitive dissonance." The purpose of a wellcontrived procedural system is not this, of course, but rather the exposure of alternative formulations of the problem, the elaboration of different courses of action, and the delineation of potential consequences as seen by the interests to be affected.
It is of course the faith of the democrat that the policy makers' desire to fashion a relatively frictionless, efficient decision system should be resisted. The purpose of democratic procedure, after all, is not to make policy making easier, but to make it more adequate.
There are at least three tests of the adequacy of a procedural system that can detach evaluation from the purposes of political leaders. First, how broad is the range of problems, how rich and flexible the alternatives that are generated for the consideration of policy makers? Second, and complimentary to the first, what is the comparative efficiency of the system in coming to conclusions, in reducing alternatives and possibilities to definitive choice? 22 Third, how close is the fit between intention and outcome? We assume that no public policy is "perfect," in the sense that it has no unanticipated consequences. However, we also assume that better policies correctly anticipate and provide for more of the consequences of choice. Since policy making is an ongoing process, the consequences of a decision made at time X become the problem to be knowledge of the procedural repertoire of a particular political system, the analyst may be able to recommend innovative ways of going about the business of formulating policy in particular issue areas.
There are at least three tests of the adequacy of a procedural system that can detach evaluation from the purposes of political leaders. First, how broad is the range of problems, how rich and flexible the alternatives that are generated for the consideration of policy makers? Second, and complimentary to the first, what is the comparative efficiency of the system in coming to conclusions, in reducing alternatives and possibilities to definitive choice? 22 Third, how close is the fit between intention and outcome? We assume that no public policy is "perfect," in the sense that it has no unanticipated consequences. However, we also assume that better policies correctly anticipate and provide for more of the consequences of choice. Since policy making is an ongoing process, the consequences of a decision made at time X become the problem to be Of course, since each policy-making process is to some extent a "voyage of discovery," 23 it would be quite crude to evaluate a decision simply by looking at what happened that was not supposed to happen. We must also consider "feedback," the capacity of the system to correct itself over time. Thus, one does evaluate the decision made at X in terms of the problem at Y, but one does so taking into account the way in which policy making between X and Y helps correct for the deficiencies in the first choice.
In the design of procedural systems, the most basic and straightforward task of the political scientist is simply to inventory the possible combinations and sequences of instruments that might be useful in the processing of different kinds of problems under specified circumstances. The role of comparative analysis is merely that of extending the search for ideas and possibilities across national frontiers.24
The current discussion of the Scandinavian ombudsman institution in the United States illustrates the normal course of such analysis. The role of the student of comparative politics has been first the conventional one of simply describing how the institution works abroad. A few have gone beyond to suggest indicated adaptations that might be appropriate to the United States. Only in such work as that of Walter Gellhorn, however, do we begin to approach the level of inquiry that might be expected of true comparative policy analysis. By analyzing the ombudsman as part of a more inclusive inventory of approaches to the function of protecting citizens against abuses by public authorities, he is able to show something of the range of alternatives that exists in the modem political repertoire for working with this problem, and he is able to suggest some of the advantages and limitations of different approaches by comparative analysis.25 Of course, since each policy-making process is to some extent a "voyage of discovery," 23 it would be quite crude to evaluate a decision simply by looking at what happened that was not supposed to happen. We must also consider "feedback," the capacity of the system to correct itself over time. Thus, one does evaluate the decision made at X in terms of the problem at Y, but one does so taking into account the way in which policy making between X and Y helps correct for the deficiencies in the first choice.
The current discussion of the Scandinavian ombudsman institution in the United States illustrates the normal course of such analysis. The role of the student of comparative politics has been first the conventional one of simply describing how the institution works abroad. A few have gone beyond to suggest indicated adaptations that might be appropriate to the United States. Only in such work as that of Walter Gellhorn, however, do we begin to approach the level of inquiry that might be expected of true comparative policy analysis. By analyzing the ombudsman as part of a more inclusive inventory of approaches to the function of protecting citizens against abuses by public authorities, he is able to show something of the range of alternatives that exists in the modem political repertoire for working with this problem, and he is able to suggest some of the advantages and limitations of different approaches by comparative analysis.25 Systematic inventory is a task that has always appealed to students of comparative politics. We need not search for a single master taxonomy of procedural instruments. The situation-specific nature of policy analysis is more apt to require ad hoc formulations for specific problems and policy arenas. However, the simple scheme suggested in Table 1 presents one generalized approach based on the potential uses of procedural instruments by the decision maker. This outline is adapted from attempts to identify stages in the policy-making process.25 Here it is not used as a descriptive model. I am not saying that all of these processes can be identified in any public decision, nor that there is any reason why they must occur in this order.27 This scheme merely indicates some of the purposes for which procedural instruments might be used by policy makers, and also the possible composition and powers of such instruments.
Policy Instrumentation
Procedural instrumentation, though particularly pertinent to the classic concerns of political science, is only one dimension of the task of policy analysis. In the design of measures, the selection from among the capabilities and resources of the state of that package of programs best suited to the accomplishment of a public objective is equally important.
Policy-oriented political scientists are interested in the problem of defining optimum strategies for coping with public problems. Unfortunately, the tradition of political science and the training of modern political scientists are poorly adapted to such work. Most public issues require detailed, expert substantive knowledge. The demographer is better prepared to explore the contours of population policy; the ecologist, environmental issues. Economists have more powerful general tools for weighing the utility of alternative courses of action in achieving specified objectives. The political scientist comes to feel that he has little relevant expertise of his own to bring to bear on such problems. Systematic inventory is a task that has always appealed to students of comparative politics. We need not search for a single master taxonomy of procedural instruments. The situation-specific nature of policy analysis is more apt to require ad hoc formulations for specific problems and policy arenas. However, the simple scheme suggested in Table 1 presents one generalized approach based on the potential uses of procedural instruments by the decision maker. This outline is adapted from attempts to identify stages in the policy-making process.25 Here it is not used as a descriptive model. I am not saying that all of these processes can be identified in any public decision, nor that there is any reason why they must occur in this order.27 This scheme merely indicates some of the purposes for which procedural instruments might be used by policy makers, and also the possible composition and powers of such instruments.
Policy-oriented political scientists are interested in the problem of defining optimum strategies for coping with public problems. Unfortunately, the tradition of political science and the training of modern political scientists are poorly adapted to such work. Most public issues require detailed, expert substantive knowledge. The demographer is better prepared to explore the contours of population policy; the ecologist, environmental issues. Economists have more powerful general tools for weighing the utility of alternative courses of action in achieving specified objectives. The political scientist comes to feel that he has little relevant expertise of his own to bring to bear on such problems. Nonetheless, in the division of labor of the policy sciences, the political scientist should be able to claim some special competence in the delineation of the problem-solving capabilities of the public order. When all is said and done, there are really only four basic forms of public policy, four ways in which the public order can make an impact on the society of which it is a part. The state can deploy its political attributes as a monopoly of legitimate force and as a focus of authority and prestige in the society. As an economic institution, the state can derive resources from the society through taxation, borrowing, and sale, and it can spend for public purposes. All the great and complex variety of forms, techniques, and programs of public policy are really elaborations of and combinations of these basic possibilities.28
For comparative policy analysis, one task becomes that of distinguishing the policy repertoire-the stock of policy equipment-that has evolved in different political systems. This would include both the more general traditions of public action that develop in any polity (direct public investment or incentives to private effort as preferred techniques) as well as the more idiosyncratic approaches to handling specific types of problems (different approaches to urban planning or compensation for properties expropriated in agrarian reform programs).
To establish the distinctiveness of the policy equipment of any political system, one must explain why instruments appear in the repertoire of some systems and not of others. One approach is to presume as normal 
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Nonetheless, in the division of labor of the policy sciences, the political scientist should be able to claim some special competence in the delineation of the problem-solving capabilities of the public order. When all is said and done, there are really only four basic forms of public policy, four ways in which the public order can make an impact on the society of which it is a part. The state can deploy its political attributes as a monopoly of legitimate force and as a focus of authority and prestige in the society. As an economic institution, the state can derive resources from the society through taxation, borrowing, and sale, and it can spend for public purposes. All the great and complex variety of forms, techniques, and programs of public policy are really elaborations of and combinations of these basic possibilities.28
To establish the distinctiveness of the policy equipment of any political system, one must explain why instruments appear in the repertoire of some systems and not of others. One approach is to presume as normal For the comparative policy analyst, the policy repertoire of a given state for coping with a specific problem includes therefore those means established and legitimate in the society; a second group of instruments that appears in the larger cultural or world stock and is potentially available for adoption; a third set that is probably not available to the particular polity except under specified conditions of change; and a fourth group that is probably unavailable to decision makers, barring regime transformation or a general change in the socioeconomic setting of the problem.
Conclusions
In the coming development of the policy sciences, the task I have outlined for comparative politics seems a modest one. Nonetheless, it is a natural and a necessary function. The search for alternatives across national frontiers is only one phase of public problem solving, but it does accompany the consideration of public business in all societies. The question is whether this function can be made more rigorous and systematic.
The construction of procedures for the unraveling of complex problems so that significant factors that we can grapple with show through, the crafting of instruments to meet these problems-these would seem to be pertinent tasks for social science, and for political science in particular. In fact, presented this way, they seem totally unexceptional, and a very minor recasting of the present agenda of the discipline. But to focus on the instruments, on the techniques of governance, may help to clarify questions that were previously not quite so meaningful. For the comparative policy analyst, the policy repertoire of a given state for coping with a specific problem includes therefore those means established and legitimate in the society; a second group of instruments that appears in the larger cultural or world stock and is potentially available for adoption; a third set that is probably not available to the particular polity except under specified conditions of change; and a fourth group that is probably unavailable to decision makers, barring regime transformation or a general change in the socioeconomic setting of the problem.
The construction of procedures for the unraveling of complex problems so that significant factors that we can grapple with show through, the crafting of instruments to meet these problems-these would seem to be pertinent tasks for social science, and for political science in particular. In fact, presented this way, they seem totally unexceptional, and a very minor recasting of the present agenda of the discipline. But to focus on the instruments, on the techniques of governance, may help to clarify questions that were previously not quite so meaningful.
